SUMMARY. Instructed to engage in intelligence against the Soviet Union, Japanese diplomat Sugihara Chiune was stationed in Helsinki in 1937–1939 and in Kaunas in 1939–1940. He became known to the world for issuing thousands of transit visas to Polish-Jewish refugees to help them escape from Soviet and Nazi persecution. Much less is known about his spy activities. Following their country’s occupation by the German army, Sugihara provided Polish secret agents with Japanese or Manchurian passports and employed their services for his clandestine undertakings. The Germans, although greatly displeased with his activities as the same agents were working against them for the Polish government-in-exile and the British government, were indifferent to Sugihara’s attempts to rescue the Jews. Despite that German authorities were successful in arresting some of Sugihara’s spies, these measures were ineffective as in most cases the agents’ Japanese or Manchurian passports bestowed them with diplomatic immunity. After the end of Lithuanian independence Sugihara was forced to leave the country and was transferred to Prague – clearly not an ideal place to observe the USSR. Therefore, he took over the newly established consulate-general in Königsberg, modern day Kaliningrad, to gain intelligence on Germany’s preparation for war against the Soviet Union in 1941. Sugihara was ultimately transferred to the legation in Romania after the consulate-general was closed under German pressure.

KEYWORDS: Japanese intelligence, Polish spies, Japanese-German relations, German-Soviet war.

SUGIHARA’S CAREER

The Japanese diplomat Sugihara Chiune was an expert in the Russian language and Russian affairs. Unlike most of his colleagues, he did not graduate from one of the famous Japanese universities, instead he gained knowledge of the language at Harbin Gakuin, a high school in Manchuria. Although initially he was merely an interpreter in the diplomatic service, his specialization on Soviet affairs gradually led him to be entrusted with more challenging assignments during the course of his career. In 1924, he married a Russian woman named Klaudia Apollonowa and converted to the Russian Orthodox faith. This marriage, however, only lasted eleven years and in 1936, he remarried to the Japanese Kikuchi Yukiko.
While the Japanese foreign ministry intended to transfer Sugihara to the Embassy in Moscow, the Soviet government did not confirm his appointment to the post knowing that his task encroached upon the field of intelligence. Instead, he was assigned to the legation in Helsinki in 1937 from where he would observe the Soviet Union and report his findings. The Japanese Minister to Finland at the time was Sakô Shûichi, who was appointed Ambassador to Poland several months later and remained in this position until the outbreak of World War II in September 1939.

**SUGIHARA’S ACTIVITIES IN KAUNAS**

In May 1939, war broke out between Japanese and Soviet troops near Nomonhan in the Mongolian-Manchurian border area. The Japanese troops soon had to recognize that the military situation was not developing in their favour. Consequently, in July 1939, the Foreign Ministry in Tokyo decided to enforce intelligence operations against the Soviet Union and to assign several observers to crucial strategic points, such as the embassy in Moscow, the Riga legation and the Lwów consulate.¹ These activities also included the foundation of a consulate-general in Kaunas, the provisional capital of Lithuania, to be led by Sugihara in the capacity of a vice-consul. By the time intelligence activities in the Baltic states had been conducted by the legation in Riga, Latvia, to which the new post in Kaunas was also subordinate.² Not a single Japanese lived in Lithuania and the country did not have common borders with the Soviet Union. Japan had originally intended to open a consulate-general in Königsberg, the capital of East Prussia and modern day Kaliningrad, but Germany did not agree with such an “unnecessary” mission. As an alternative, Kaunas was chosen.³

During Sugihara’s service in Kaunas from 1939 to 1940, the situation in the world, and with it the fate of Lithuania changed dramatically. The country had been relatively isolated due to territorial disputes with neighbouring Poland and Germany, and might have felt honoured to be recognized by a nation as important as Japan. In 1920, Poland had annexed the historical capital of Lithuania, known as Wilno in Polish, Wilna in German and as Vilnius in Lithuanian, and its surrounding area, while Germany demanded the return of the Memel area (Klaipėda in

² Ibid., 106.
Lithuanian), which Lithuania had seized after World War I. Japan, together with Great Britain, Lithuania, France and Italy, was one of the 5 signatories of the convention of 8 May 1924, which gave Lithuania all rights to the territory of Memel/Klaipėda.

Poland took advantage of the international confusion caused by the German annexation of Austria in March 1938 for a military build-up at the border to Lithuania. Behind this move there was an intention to force the latter to re-establish diplomatic relations, as well as to effectively renounce its demands on Wilna. Moreover, a Polish invasion would have caused German troops to attack and occupy other parts of Lithuania; and so Kaunas accepted the Polish ultimatum. Lithuania’s bargaining position with Germany was equally disadvantageous, with the latter coercing the former into returning Memel to the Reich in March 1939.4

It was against this backdrop that Sugihara headed for Kaunas at the end of August 1939. En route, he received the information that Germany and the Soviet Union had concluded a non-aggression pact,5 which was a clear violation of the Antikomintern Pact, concluded between Berlin and Tokyo in 1936. This step was followed by the German-Soviet Border and Friendship Treaty, concluded on 28 September 1939, which divided Eastern Europe into respective zones of interest, according to which Lithuania fell under the Soviet sphere of influence, including part of the Wilna area, which Lithuania had only recently regained after the defeat of Poland. This arrangement allowed Polish and Jewish refugees to travel to other parts of Lithuania, including Kaunas, via Wilna/Vilnius. While the territorial division of Eastern Europe was only addressed in secret supplementary clauses to the German-Soviet treaties, effects of a gradual takeover of the Baltic states by the Soviet Union were soon palpable.

Today, Sugihara is best known for his rescue operation of Polish-Jewish refugees in Lithuania through the issuance of transit visas. However, several reasons account for the fact that these activities find no mention whatsoever in surviving German documents. Firstly, Lithuania became not an area under Nazi control, but part of Soviet territory in 1940. Secondly, at the time an outright annihilation of all Jews, which constituted a priority for German state policy, was not implemented, only their expulsion from Europe – which was effectively promoted by Sugihara’s efforts. Thirdly, the German legation was preoccupied with handling the transmigration of ethnic Germans from Lithuania to Germany lest they fall under Soviet


5 Shiraishi M., op. cit., 117.
rule. The lines where Jews are mentioned in German documents merely express the deep animosity of Lithuanians against Jewish refugees from Poland.6

What caused greater concern for Germany was the fact that for his nascent intelligence work Sugihara employed several former Polish intelligence officers who operated not only against the Soviet Union, but also against Germany in favour of the Polish government-in-exile, as well as Great Britain and France. The Japanese could make use of their good contacts with the Polish espionage organization, with which it cooperated closely since the re-establishment of the Polish state in 1919, following which Poland built up a solid intelligence structure.7 A team of young Polish mathematicians hacked the cipher of the German Enigma machine in 1932, crucially influencing the course of war for the allied nations during World War II. The Poles, however, never shared that secret with the Japanese.8 They assisted, however, the Japanese army in Manchuria as cypher specialists.9

Ever since the mid-1930s, Germany and Japan had been intending to include Poland into a common Anti-Comintern block, conceived as a military alliance against the Soviet Union. Stalin feared the establishment of such a block which seemed possible because of the German-Polish Nonaggression Treaty of 1934, the Japanese takeover of Manchuria in 1931, Japanese-Polish activities to support independence movements of the Soviet Caucasus republics, and the Japanese-Polish intelligence cooperation. As Tadeusz Romer, the Polish Ambassador to Japan, stated in 1937, Japan had the value of a loaded pistol directed permanently against the head of the hostile USSR.10 The German-Polish-Japanese nexus and the spy hysteria arising from it is often seen as the leitmotif of Stalin’s Great Terror in 1937.11

Warsaw, however, refused to play the role of an “anti-Russian trench.”12 Therefore, Nazi Germany decided to conquer Poland, whereas Japan chose to maintain

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6 Auswärtiges Amt, Politisches Archiv [hence: AAPA, Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry, Berlin]: Gesandtschaft Kaunas, Box 59: 3 anti-Semitic leaflets from Lithuania. Ibid., R28870, Büro Reichsaußenminister Minister Zechlin’s report to Weizsäcker 28 June 1940.
8 Kozaczuk W. Enigma: How the German Machine Cipher was Broken, and how it was Read by the Allies in World War Two. Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1984.
amicable relations and attempted – though ultimately in vain – to mediate between Berlin and Warsaw, where Ambassador Sakô struggled hard to achieve a conciliation between the two opposing countries.\[^{13}\] Even after Germany’s attack on Poland in 1939 and its ensuing occupation, Japan, although it had to sever diplomatic relations under German pressure in October 1941, continued to have contacts with Polish organizations including intelligence agents. The leader of the Polish intelligence organization in Lithuania, code-named Wierza (Willow), was Ludwik Hryncewicz, who succeeded in placing a Pole as a butler in Sugihara’s household to gain knowledge on the state of affairs within the mission.\[^{14}\]

Three Polish agents became particularly useful for the Japanese:

First, Captain Alfons Jakubianiec, alias Jerzy Kunczewicz, nickname Kuba, working in Berlin;

Second, Lieutenant Stanisław Daszkiewicz, alias Jan Stanisław Perz, working in Kaunas and later in other places, and third, Michał Rybikowski, alias Peter (or: Piotr) Iwanow, operating in Riga under the Military Attaché Major Feliks Brzeskwinski from October 1939 onwards and later in Stockholm, with the Japanese military attachés – first under Nishimura Toshio and from October 1940 onwards under Onodera Makoto. After the end of the independence of the Baltic states, the Swedish capital became the most important place for the Poles to collect intelligence, under the code name “Base Anna”.

In an SS document dealing with the Japanese-Polish intelligence network Rybikowski is wrongly named Rybicki, while Daszkiewicz and Jakubianiec were known only by their aliases, Perz and Kunczewicz respectively.\[^{15}\] As Daszkiewicz remembered after the war, Rybikowski had visited Sugihara in the Japanese consulate-general in Kaunas in March or April 1940 at Jakubianiec/Kunczewicz’s urging. During the meeting Sugihara had requested Rybikowski to explore Soviet troop concentrations and strategic preparations in the border area. After that first meeting the two men met again several times, and Rybikowski handed his reports about his observations in Russian language to Sugihara.\[^{16}\]

Later, the cooperation between Sugihara and Rybikowski was not very close. It even seemed to have been characterized by a certain degree of distance. The reason could have been that the Pole suspected the secretary Wolfgang Gudze


\[^{14}\text{Pałasz-Rutkowska E., }op. cit., 289–290.\]

\[^{15}\text{AAPA, R 101.091, SD-Berichte betr. Irland und Japan. Heydrich to Ribbentrop 7 August, 1941: Japanische Spionage im Reich, Betr. SD-Meldung zur Lage in Japan.}\]

(or: Gudsche) of the consulate-general, an ethnic German with Lithuanian citizenship, to be a Gestapo agent who later joined the German military. On the other hand, Gudze was very cooperative in issuing transit visas for Polish-Jewish refugees and is remembered by them with great appreciation. Also, the Sugihara family kept him in fond memory, keeping a photo of him posing with their children. The claim of several Poles that he was a Gestapo agent, remains unsubstantiated, with no records of a person with such a name found in German documents. Nevertheless, the Sugihara family did not reject the possibility that he was an agent in the German service.

Rybikowski did not stay in Kaunas. He went to Riga, where he took charge of intelligence activities in the Baltic States with the support of the Japanese military attaché Onouchi Hiroshi who, acting in agreement with Sugihara, provided him with a passport issued by the Manchurian legation in Berlin. Finally, in 1940, anticipating the Soviet annexation of Latvia, Rybikowski escaped from Riga to Stockholm, where he worked together with the Stockholm-based Japanese military attachés, initially with Nishimura Toshio and later with Onodera Makoto. In the summer of 1940, Nishimura travelled from Stockholm to Berlin in order to persuade the Japanese ambassador to employ Jakubianiec/Kuncewicz, who was granted a room in the office of the military attaché.

Jakubianiec/Kuncewicz’ employment in the Japanese Embassy was no secret to the German counter-intelligence either, although at the time, the latter was unable to act against the holder of a Japanese service passport. As such, Jakubianiec/Kuncewicz was also able to use the Japanese diplomatic bags for sending his reports to the legation in Sweden, where they reached Rybikowski, who passed them to the Japanese military attaché as well as the Polish government-in-exile in London. Ever since his role as a military attaché to Riga from 1936 to 1938, Onodera had maintained friendly relations with his Polish colleague Major Feliks Brzeskwinski, who later became a military attaché in Stockholm and remained in this position under the Polish government-in-exile. They now resumed their cooperation as they had done in Latvia. A deep friendship developed between Onodera and Rybikowski as well and lasted for decades after the end of World War II, when Rybikowski

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19 Information from Sugihara’s son Nobuki.
21 AAPA, R 101.091, Heydrich to Ribbentrop 7 August, 1941.
22 Pałasz-Rutkowska E., op. cit., 298.
had immigrated to the USA.\(^{23}\) There was a certain degree of cooperation between Onodera and Sugihara,\(^{24}\) but it seems to have been very limited, potentially due to the suspicion that the Gestapo had planted an agent within the Japanese consular generalized in Kaunas, the aforementioned Wolfgang Gudze. Nevertheless, Onodera and Sugihara shared the same spies, intelligence materials, and courier routes throughout their respective careers.

While still in Kaunas, Jakubianiec/Kunczewicz introduced Sugihara to the intelligence officer Daszkiewicz/Perz. The latter followed the Japanese diplomat to several positions, became acquainted with the vice-consul and, with growing familiarity, provided him with considerable intelligence. In turn, Sugihara issued Japanese service passports to Jakubianiec/Kunczewicz and Daszkiewicz/Perz.\(^{25}\) Both this fact and their intelligence cooperation were known to the German legation in Kaunas, although it only knew the spies by their aliases. The German legation mentioned that Sugihara maintained a relatively active contact with the German mission, which, however, was of mostly administrative character. Suspiciously, his interest, which mainly revolved around military issues, was so strong that it suggested his function as a consul to be merely a camouflage. Despite behaving in a pro-German way, the report of the German legation continued, he employed the two aforementioned former Polish citizens holding Japanese passports in his consulate-general. Both persons were known to the German military intelligence Abwehr as pro-British. The German Legation therefore advised the Foreign Ministry in Berlin to adopt a certain reserved attitude towards Sugihara.\(^{26}\)

Later, one of the reports concluded that due to his activities in Kaunas, Sugihara should have been considered a friend of England and Poland, and that he had drawn attention to himself by his particular interest in German military affairs. This report originated from Reinhard Heydrich who, as the leader of the Reichssicherheitshauptamt (RSHA = Reich Main Security Office) – the terror and intelligence organisation of the SS to fight all “enemies of the Reich” – was second only to Heinrich Himmler within the SS.\(^{27}\)

After the war, Daszkiewicz/Perz remembered that he had asked Sugihara to issue transit visas for his Polish agents, which demonstrated that, contrary to common

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\(^{23}\) Onodera Y. *Ibid.*, 152–153; post-war correspondence between Rybikowski and Onodera in the possession of the Onodera family, in the first years in Russian, later in English.


\(^{25}\) Pałasz-Rutkowska E., op. cit., 287–89.

\(^{26}\) AAPA, R 119860, Akten betreffend Chiune Sugihara, Königsberg): Deutsche Gesandtschaft Kaunas to Foreign Ministry 2 October, 1940.

\(^{27}\) AAPA, R 101.091 Betreffend SD-Meldung zur Lage in Japan. Heydrich to Ribbentrop 7 August, 1941: Japanische Spionage im Reich.
belief, the first visas which Sugihara issued were not aimed at Jewish refugees. Later, when the vice-consul issued many visas to Polish-Jewish refugees, Daszkiewicz/Perz fabricated a second stamp so that he could create counterfeit visas for his agents. In April 1941, the German Foreign Ministry demanded from Tokyo to prohibit Poles of military service age to transit via Japan en route to the USA. Nevertheless, several dozens of Polish refugees reached Canada via Japan in the next few months to enlist in the Polish volunteer force then being raised in North America, among them many Jews who, however, were met with antipathy of anti-Semitic countrymen in the military.

**SUGIHARA IN PRAGUE**

On 1 September 1940, the Sugiharas left Kaunas by train to Berlin when the legation was closed down with the demise of Lithuania’s independence. Sugihara reported to Ambassador Kurusu Saburô, who belonged to the pro-American faction among the diplomats of his country. Shortly afterwards, Sugihara was appointed consul-general to Prague with the title of vice-consul, where he arrived on 12 September 1940. The legation had been closed in April 1939, but it continued operating as consulate-general until March 1941. Not much is known about Sugihara’s activities there, but at that time he sent his report to the Foreign Ministry, stating that he had issued 2,139 visas in Kaunas, mostly of them to Jewish refugees.

One of his employees in Prague was Gerolf von Coudenhove-Kalergi, son of the former Austrian-Hungarian diplomat Heinrich Graf Coudenhove-Kalergi, who had served in Tokyo for several years during the Meiji era and married a Japanese woman called Aoyama Mitsuko. Gerolf was a lawyer and a Japanologist and taught Japanese history and Japanese language at the Prague University. He had belonged to the Sudetendeutsche Partei, the pro-Nazi party of the Germans in Czechoslovakia, and later applied for membership in the Nazi Party. Yet clearly due to his non-Aryan racial background, he was refused membership, and also lost his teaching position at the university. He was, nevertheless, later recognized as “worth” serving in the German military. Much to his embarrassment, however, he was forced to

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31 Shiraishi M., op. cit., 179.
leave the army in 1944, because his brother, Richard von Coudenhove-Kalergi, the founder of the Pan-Europe movement, at that time was a French citizen, married to a Jewish actress, and had held anti-Nazi lectures in the USA.32

SUGIHARA’S TRANSFER TO KÖNIGSBERG

After the conclusion of the Tripartite Pact on 27 September, 1940 Japan once again urged Germany to allow the foundation of a Japanese consulate-general in Königsberg, the capital of the province East Prussia, and after some reluctance Berlin finally gave in at the end of the year. In March 1941, the Japanese consulate-general in Prague was closed, and Sugihara was transferred with the rank of vice-consul, but de facto as consul-general to Königsberg, where the mission started to function in the same month. However, against Japanese wishes, Germany refused to extend the administrative district of the consulate-general to the areas of Ciechanów and Suwałki, former Polish territories that had been incorporated into East Prussia after the defeat of Poland and named Zichenau and Sudauen, respectively.33

Sugihara’s main duty was to gain intelligence on the conditions of German-Soviet relations. Both countries were tied by a non-aggression pact and a friendship treaty, but obviously the relations were tense. Japan itself concluded a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union in April 1941 and was interested in the continuation of peace between Berlin and Moscow.

Although the Japanese Embassy in Berlin had asked the German Foreign Ministry to instruct the local authorities to cooperate with the new consulate-general and to ease its functions,34 Sugihara was not welcomed by German officials and Nazi representatives in Königsberg who tried to isolate him socially. In the beginning, questions of the diplomatic protocol arose, but soon it became clear that the animosity was deeply rooted in the Japanese-Polish intelligence activities. Particularly Erich Koch stormed against Sugihara. He was the Gauleiter of East Prussia, i.e., the Nazi leader of that province directly appointed by Hitler, while also acting as the Oberregierungspräsident or Oberpräsident (Governor General) which, while not a party position, was but the highest administrative post in the province. In early June 1941, Koch complained to the Foreign Ministry in Berlin that Sugihara did not behave along diplomatic rules and customs. He had asked for two lists

33 AAPA, R 119860, Note for Peter-Pirkham 28 May 1941; Peter-Pirkham to Oberpräsident in Königsberg 11 June 1941.
34 Ibid., Verbal note of the Japanese Embassy in Berlin for the German Foreign Ministry 10 April 1941.
containing 50 and 100 names of prominent persons, whom he could invite to receptions, but Koch delayed the answer and did not accept Sugihara’s invitation for dinner, received by himself and his wife, because he was convinced that the Japanese vice-consul had to be invited by him, Erich Koch, first. He also forbade his officials to accept Sugihara’s invitations and refused to attend a reception in the consulate-general on 29 April 1941 on the occasion of Emperor Hirohito’s birthday, and declined to write an entry in a book of congratulations for the Tennô. Koch claimed that he had not yet received the exequatur, the patent which a head of state issues to a foreign consul, guaranteeing the consul’s rights and privileges of office and ensuring recognition.35

Furthermore, Koch was not amused with Sugihara’s efforts to sound out German officials and journalists with questions, such as: What is Germany planning with regards to Ukraine, since rumours are heard that it is planning to lease the territory for 25 years? Why are there so many troops concentrated in East Prussia? Will there be a war with the United States? Again and again he asked detailed questions about Germany’s relations with the Soviet Union and Rudolf Hess’ so-called “peace mission” to Great Britain: He could not understand why Hess was entrusted with such a high position as Hitler’s deputy, given that his grave illness had been common knowledge for a long time. Therefore, Koch demanded that Sugihara would be recalled from his post.36

Indeed, Sugihara was busy with espionage activities driving around with his secretary Satô and his Polish agent Daszkiewicz/Perz, ostensibly on excursions, such as picnics, but actually with the intention to take photos of the Wehrmacht’s concentration of troops and tank positions against the Soviet Union, sometimes accompanied by his little children and followed by cars with German secret police observers. In early May, they went as far as Memel/Klaipėda, spying out petrol depots and tank deployments in the forests. Sugihara counted ten military train transports from Berlin to Königsberg, observed German troop concentrations in the former Polish territory and concluded that some decision had to be expected in German-Soviet relations in June. The more so as German officers had received the order to learn enough Russian to be able to at least understand maps. Their teachers were Germans and White Russians (Belarusians) from the Baltic countries. He further reported that transport vessels had been anchoring in the port of East Prussian Pillau for more than a month and that German tanks were heading towards Lithuania.37

35 AAPA, R 119860, Oberpräsident der Provinz Ostpreußen, Koch, to Foreign Ministry 5 June 1941.
36 Ibid.
What Sugihara did not suspect at that time was the fact that Soviet cryptanalysts had deciphered many of his telegrams. This included a report of 31 May 1941, which revealed that many military transport ships were concentrated in Memel and Pillau, that East Prussia was brimming with troops and that two days earlier, Sugihara had counted 29 military transports on a train ride from Berlin to Königsberg.38

From Stockholm, Military Attaché Onodera sent similar reports like Sugihara’s about an imminent German attack on the Soviet Union, based on the information he had received from the Polish side.39 However, the Japanese ambassadors in Berlin and Moscow, Ôshima and Tatekawa, who were no career diplomats but high military officers and never inspected the border area, did not believe in the probability of a German-Soviet war, declaring instead that the warfare against Great Britain was Hitler’s utmost priority.40

Just as Sugihara and Onodera had predicted, the German attack on the Soviet Union began on 22 June 1941. Two weeks later, on July 6, Jakubianiec/Kunczewicz fell into the trap of the German secret police. He was arrested in the Tiergarten park of Berlin when he was receiving secret documents from a courier who had arrived from Warsaw. Interrogated by cruel methods used by the SS he disclosed many details of the Polish-Japanese spy ring, only to be executed later. Together with him, Salomea Łapińska was arrested, who worked as an alleged cook in the legation of Manchuria, a country of which she held a passport, and so her identity and intelligence work were disclosed.41 By the interrogations applied to Jakubianiec it became clear that he had acted as an information collector for Polish intelligence and that his reports were transferred from Rybikowski to Onodera, to the Polish government-in-exile under General Władysław Sikorski, and to the General of the Jesuits Władimir Ledóchowski in Rome, an ardent anti-Nazi activist. It became also known that the Polish network had transferred not only letters, but also money in Japanese diplomatic bags.42

41 AAPA, R 101.091, Heydrich to Ribbentrop 7 August, 1941.
42 AAPA, R 101.091, Heydrich to Ribbentrop 7 August 1941.
From the interrogations the Germans also found out that the Japanese intelligence post in Königsberg under Sugihara worked with three sub-stations: one was situated in Wilna and directed by a former Polish student named <Stanisław> Wojciechowski, another one operated in Kaunas, directed by the Lithuanian Kozioło and the third one in Grodno under a Pole, called Rys, which was obviously his alias. Finally, there was a mobile station (fliegende Station) situated on the railroad between Biaronowice and Białystok, founded by the Polish Captain <Stanisław> Kasprzyk and at the time directed by Captain Tadeusz Olszewski, disguised as a railway employee.  

Germany was also preoccupied deciphering Japanese telegrams, especially by the activities of the so-called Forschungsamt (Research Office) under Hermann Göring’s Air Ministry, the contents of which gradually disclosed the Japanese-Polish espionage network in close cooperation with Reinhard Heydrich’s SS organization and the Foreign Ministry. Göring, therefore, demanded that Sugihara would be recalled from his post. In autumn 1941, the Japanese Consulate-General in Königsberg was closed down and Sugihara was transferred to the Japanese legation in Romania, where he took over his post in November 1941.

Ambassador Ôshima in Berlin now forbade all contacts with the Poles fearing for damaging relations with the Germans, but Onodera and Rybikowski continued their cooperation in Stockholm until 1944. After the Tiergarten arrests, Daszkiewicz/Perz, fearing for his safety, left Sugihara’s service and joined the Polish underground army. Although Japan and Poland were allied with opposing belligerents and the London based government-in-exile declared war on Japan four days after Pearl Harbor, the cooperation in the field of intelligence continued. After Daszkiewicz/Perz’s had left him, Sugihara could cooperate with two Japanese intelligence officers and the Military Attaché Colonel Fujizuka Shikao in Bucharest, who had been assistant attaché in Warsaw from 1933 to 1936 and had been involved with the Poles in spy activities against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, he maintained close contact with the Spanish Minister to Romania, Marquis de Barzan-Allana, and was able to use the diplomatic bags of the Spanish legation. Though his findings were not as sensational as during his time in Königsberg, he

43 Ibid.
45 AAPA, Büro des Staatsekretärs, Japan, Vol. 4, Schrötters’ (of Göring’s staff) letter to Siegfried (Foreign Ministry), 22 August 1941.
46 Pałasz-Rutkowska E., op. cit., 301.
47 Chapman J., op. cit., Japan in Poland’s, 253.

received Imperial orders in 1944, the Sixth and Fifth Class of the Holy Treasure (Zuihôshô).  

STOCKHOLM AS NEW CENTRE OF INTELLIGENCE

At the time, the Germans’ main task was to make efforts to stop Rybikowski’s activities in Stockholm. The chief of the Abwehr, the German military intelligence organization, Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, spoke out against approaching Ambassador Ôshima regarding the Japanese-Polish network in Sweden, since that would only alarm Onodera, who would arrange a flight for Rybikowski to England and he would be replaced by other agents.  

Quite possibly, Canaris was hoping to avoid inconveniencing Onodera as they had friendly relations ever since their first met in Riga in 1937. Interrogated by the Americans after the war, Onodera referred to Canaris as his close friend. During the war, they used to meet briefly whenever they both were in Berlin at the same time, discussing the overall war situation and the needs of their respective intelligence services. At Onodera’s request, Canaris sent him reports of the Supreme Command of the German Forces in their original form, without the usual censorship by the Attaché Department. Onodera forwarded these data to the Japanese Military Attaché in Berlin, who were unsuccessful in obtaining reliable reports from the German side due to the mutual mistrust between the Germans and the Japanese Embassy.

Instead, attempts were made to lure Rybikowski to Germany, but they failed since the Polish agent and Onodera became suspicious. Hans Wagner, the chief of the “K. O. (= Kriegsorganisation) Schweden”, the German intelligence base in Sweden, demanded a list of Rybikowski’s agents in Germany and Poland, threatening to submit his protest to Tokyo through Foreign Minister Ribbentrop or Keitel, the head of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces (OKW), if his wish was not fulfilled but Onodera ignored this demand. According to contemporary sources, as well as Onodera’s own statements, during interrogations by U.S. intelligence in 1946, he deeply distrusted the chief of the Abwehr in Stockholm, Hans Wagner.

48 Information with photos provided by Sugihara Naoki.  
49 AAPA, R 101.091, Rohleder by order of Canaris 15 February, 1942 to Büro Ritter.  
50 Onodera 2, No. 0022, Strategic Services Unit, War Department, 30 September 1946: Japanese Wartime intelligence Activities in Northern Europe; <https://www.cia.gov/.../ONODERA,%20MAKOTO%20201-0000047%252> [2016 10 06].  
52 Ibid., 135.  
The Germans’ plan in 1943 offered Sweden to release two of its citizens who had been arrested in occupied Poland for spying in favour of Poland and Great Britain in exchange for Rybikowski. Stockholm, however, refused the proposal.\footnote{AAPA, R101865, Abwehr Schweden: Himmler to Ribbentrop 31 December 1942.}

The efforts of the Abwehr’s representative in Stockholm, Hans Wagner, to persuade Onodera to hand over Rybikowski were equally unsuccessful, since the Pole was too valuable as a spy for the Japanese and had become the military attaché’s personal friend. The legation even granted Rybikowski a Japanese passport instead of his former Manchurian one, since Sweden did not recognize the Japanese puppet state Manchukuo.\footnote{Onodera Y., op. cit., 104.} In March 1944, Rybikowski retreated to Great Britain. Sometimes it is claimed that Rybikowski had feared that the Nazis could attempt on his life or plan an abduction to explain his escape to London possibly with Onodera Makoto’s help.\footnote{Chapman J., op. cit., Japan in Poland’s, 250–251.}

In reality, Swedish documents prove that it was the Swedish intelligence which had uncovered Rybikowski’s spy activities, and namely the authorities in Stockholm forced Rybikowski to leave the country. Otherwise he would have been arrested for espionage, which might have caused diplomatic problems because of his Japanese passport. Perhaps Sweden also had to evade German pressure for extradition. Considering such circumstances, his exit to London was the best solution not only for Japan, but also for Sweden and the Polish government-in-exile.\footnote{Information from Bert Edström, Stockholm. Also Onodera’s interrogation by the Americans 20 July 1946 in Sugamo prison. Tokyo: Kato T., op. cit., Vol. 1, 135, 139.}

The effectiveness of the Polish intelligence organization in Sweden “Station Anna“ was severely damaged by this loss, but Rybikowski was able to continue sending reports from England to Onodera via his Polish agents in Sweden, even information on British troops in the Pacific War.\footnote{Onodera Y., op. cit., 143; Onodera’s interrogation by the Americans 20 July 1946 in Sugamo prison. Tokyo: Kato T., op. cit., Vol. 1, 134.} He later joined the Polish army under General Anders in Italy.

Sugihara fell into Soviet hands after Romania had changed sides in the war and was occupied by Soviet troops in August 1944, and was transferred to the Soviet Union, managing to return to Japan only in 1947. According to his family, the Russians had attempted to convert him to work for them, but Sugihara refused.\footnote{Information from Sugihara’s son Naoki.} Later, he spent some years in Moscow as a businessman.
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VOKIETIJA IR CHIUNE SUGIHARA: JAPONIJOS IR LENKIJOS ŽVALGYBOS BENDRADARBIAVIMAS IR KONTRAŽVALGYBA


RAKTAŽODŽIAI: Japonijos žvalgyba, lenkų šnipai, Japonijos ir Vokietijos santykiai, Vokietijos ir Sovietų Sąjungos karas.