During the period of 1995–2008, Sino–Taiwanese relations became of significant importance in East Asia. From the very beginning, China and Taiwan tried to find ways how to balance their interests, because it became clear that both sides seek for different goals and the question of unification is differently understood. Taiwan tried to find a positive-symmetrical balance, whereas mainlanders constructed their rules of the game based on positive-asymmetrical relations. Positive position can be drawn from their general agreement that for both sides the issue of unification is the key political and security issue. Starting from 1995–1996 cross-strait crisis, political and security balancing turned out to be negative. Taiwan was more and more eager for its own regional role and its own political identity, what irritated Beijing to great extent, and finally provoked its military reaction. After Lee Teng-hui’s outstanding performance in regional and international levels, his successor Chen Shui-bian was lowered down to the earth. He had to understand the causes of PRC’s negative asymmetry to Taiwan’s real political and economical life and, thus, be more sensitive about provoking Beijing and security balance in the region. In turn, PRC calmed down for a while and took a firm position of negative asymmetrical position towards Taiwan.

**Keywords:** China–Taiwan relations, unification, cross-strait crisis, military intimidation

**INTRODUCTION**

Taiwan in PRC’s understanding is an issue of national principles and pride, and, thus, needs to be re-ceded to the mainland, especially, after
Hong Kong and Macao, in 1997 and 1999 accordingly, were re-ceded to PRC “Taiwan becomes the last piece in the puzzle”\(^1\). However, it is not easy for both sides across the strait to get into constructive dialogue. First of all, again, both sides cannot find compromising meanings to define their relations after Cold-war. In the mainland’s proposal for the unification the formula of Deng Xiaoping of “one country, two systems” is dominating. The position of Taiwan about its status in the future is not clear so far, because it, also, depends on those who are in power and their views. For example, President Lee Teng-hui “had declared the ROC and the PRC were two separate but equal entities that must, at some time, unify. However, before any unification, China must democratize”\(^2\).

Despite of good ideas, the reality from the political point of view is rather cold. Even though the economic interaction is more and more intensive across the strait, however, booming economy did not improve China’s political image in Taiwan.

Also, the voice of regional players such as Japan and the US is also very influential; therefore, Taiwan can not be very flexible on its own decisions. For example, during the Lee Teng-hui era, Taiwan demonstrated active efforts to push towards independence, whereas his successor Chen Shui-bian was already not that flexible on his considerations about Taiwan’s independence or other issues leading towards Taiwan’s internationalization. There is no way that PRC could step back from its unification formula. Therefore, the dynamics of unification issue is making a great impact on cross-strait political situation. Thus, in this article the question of Sino-Taiwanese unification and its developing during tenures of two Taiwanese presidents will be raised.

**REVISING CHINA – TAIWAN RELATIONS**

Looking back into the history, the Nationalist Government took control over Taiwan after the Second World War. Mao Zedong took power in Mainland in 1949, and Chen Kai-shek (or Jiang Jieshi) with 2 million of his supporters fled to Taiwan\(^3\). Thus, they established the Republic of China on Taiwan and enabled the Constitution of 1946.

In the same year, the US decided that Formosa is a strategic place
and put the island under their security umbrella to provide protection from Communists. In a half of century, Taiwan developed its market economy and became one of four East Asian economic tigers. However, the political system was highly controlled by Nationalists. Only in the year of 2000, the first time in island’s history the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) took power from Guomindang in a peaceful election way. Thus, Taiwan’s democratization and political transformation presented new worries for the PRC. In addition, in the Legislative Yuan elections in the beginning of 2008, the political balance was favorable for the Guomindang again. The party won 81 seat leaving only 27 seats for Democrats. One can predict, that the results are satisfying Mainland, even though Communist party did not comment on the poll results, and this might cause the closer relations between two sides across the straits. The situation was opposite from that in 1995 and 1996, when PRC tried to intimidate Taiwan during its legislature and first ever democratic Presidential elections. Then China deployed some 150,000 troops in Fujian Province which is the nearest to Taiwan and conducted three military exercises including “missile tests close to Keelung and Gaoxiong, Taiwan’s two most important seaports; a live-ammunition military exercise, and a large-scale amphibious landing exercise”. Taiwan was seriously on high alert, and was prepared to deal with the communists. Moreover, the US, also, responded immediately and sent two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area close to Taiwan.

The evolution of the relations and unification process are based on the power shift in China and Taiwan and, thus, this part is divided into two parts: the period of 1995–2000, and the period of 2000–2008. During this time the security relations between both straits were very dynamic and intense and trended to the various dimensions; therefore, in order to get a clearer illustration of the security situation, first of all, the political dimension of relations is tested.

As for political dimension there are two possible triggers for conflict between two straits: 1. a move toward full separate independence on the part of Taiwan government; 2. a reunification of China on the behalf of PRC. Therefore, the unification process should be very carefully considered and planned.
1995–2000: HISTORICAL BREAKTHROUGH AND TOUGH REALITY

During the decades of Cold war, the relations between China and Taiwan were frosty and of minimal contact. As Yuan I writes, “The Taiwan-mainland China reconciliation begun by the late President Chiang Ching-kuo and developed by his successor Lee Teng-hui has been one of the most important strategic breakthroughs in the Taiwan Strait since the 1949 civil war”. In the post-Cold war period, the major institutions for political dialogue were established on both sides. In Taiwan those were the National Unification Council (NUC) established on 7 October, 1990, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) established in late January, 1991, and Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) in March, 1991. On the Mainland side, the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) was established in December, 1991. In 1992, ARATS and SEF actively discussed and consulted about future dialogue. It was agreed that “the one-China principle was unavoidable issue in the talks on functional affairs between the two sides”. Both sides, then, reached the consensus, which consisted of four key ideas:

*The two sides of the Taiwan Strait are agreed that there is only one China; Each side claims itself to be part of one China; Each acknowledges the existence of the other; Each is entitled to define one China differently from the other and state the definition orally.*

The historical breakthrough in bilateral communication was reached during Wang-Koo meeting on April 27, 1993 in Singapore. However, as L. Sheng notices, China’s emphasis on the historical momentum of renewing bilateral talks was overestimated, because later it turned out to be obvious, that it was “well-designed tactic to mislead Beijing into the belief that Lee was interested in reunification, and that the increasing tendency towards independence in Taiwan was not something that Lee agreed to but something he was not able to stop”. Since then, and, also, after Lee’s conversation with Japanese writer Ryotaro Shiba in 1994, when he called Guomindang the regime that came to Taiwan from the outside (wailai zhengquan 外來政權), realized that it can not trust Lee on the reunification matters. Moreover, bilateral relations worsened after March 1994 Qiandao Lake (千島湖) Incident, when 24 Taiwanese
tourists were killed in PRC. Beijing could not stay aside observing Lee’s international steps, such as “go south” policy in December 1993 or “vacation” diplomacy to the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand in February 1994. Under the title of “vacation”, “visit”, or “holiday” diplomacy, Lee journeyed to numerous countries including the Philippines, Singapore, Indonesia, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan”.

Of course, not only Taiwanese first popular election for governor of Taiwan province or elections for metropolitan city mayors in December 1994, irritated China, but also the fact that Clinton’s administration issued visa for Lee Teng-hui to make a “private” visit to the States where he made a speech in his former alma mater, Cornell University, on June 9, 1995, and, thus, shocked Beijing. As a response to Lee’s visit, China launched “the so-called “wengongwuhe” (political criticism and military threat) against Taiwan …, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had used military drills and missile tests as a warning to Taiwan”.

The PRC leaders described a trip as a Lee Teng-hui’s attempt to present Taiwan as an independent state. Important to notice, that in January, 1995, Chinese leader Jiang Zemin issued “The 8 Points Preposition for China’s Reunification” on January 30, 1995. He stated, that “Adherence to the principle of one China is the basis and premise for peaceful reunification. China’s sovereignty and territory must never be allowed to suffer split.” Thus, he confirmed about PRC’s steadfast position towards the unification issue of both sides across the strait.

However, despite of nice words and a perspective of auspicious future for reunification, Taiwan was also looking for the ways to gain over the international community to recognize island’s sovereignty and a right to individual development and statehood. Beijing at that time, feeling the danger to loose Taiwan, started military intimidation seeking to change the pro-independency direction of Taiwanese leaders and people on the island.

**MILITARY INTIMIDATION**

While Taiwan was carrying on its democratic reforms and local, legislative and presidential elections were implemented, PRC tried to
intimidate Taiwanese by demonstrating and testing its military might. Thus, “by claiming that Taiwan’s unchallenged separation is shameful”26. Chinese military leaders could force Jiang Zemin to start military actions and, then, the strait crisis accelerated in 1995–1996. On July 19, 1995, Beijing announced that it would conduct “a series of naval-and-air joint maneuvers and missile tests in the East Sea, the North of Taiwan. Starting from July 21, China blockaded the north of Taiwan and test-fired two missiles”27 and, intimidated and warned Taiwan for the first time after the Cold War. China, thus, halted all merchant shipping in one of the busiest sea lines for a week28. On November 15, PLA began “the largest and most complex amphibious maneuvers ever undertaken in the Taiwan Strait”29. There were two hundred landing craft, one hundred vessels, and from sixteen to eighteen thousands military personnel mobilized for the military exercises30.

The events in the Taiwan Strait did not remain without international attention. First of all, it was a significant test for the US to prove how strong is the obligation to preserve peace and stability in the cross-strait. On 19 December, 1995, the US aircraft carrier Nimitz, on the road from Japan to Persian Gulf, “sailed through the Taiwan Strait, the first US carrier to do so for 17 years”31. However, the US administration was largely passive at that time, and the appearance of Nimitz was mere symbolical.32 Japan was also worrying about the situation in the region. Before that, Japan was in its deep sleep and the Taiwan Strait crisis was “a wakeup call for Japan”33. Japan did not expect that China will act in such an aggressive way to intimidate Taiwan not to seek independence, because Japanese thought, that “China had changed with economic reform and opening”34.

Furthermore, in February, 1996, PLA started preparations for the subsequent military maneuvers, “Troops and aircraft from all over China poured into the Nanjing “War Zone”. … elements from all three of PLA navy’s fleets were activated, and air-defense units armed with SA-10B missiles were transferred to the exercise area”35. The exercises were carried on eighty kilometers closer than the exercises in 1995. The military simulations were planned by the Central Military Commission (CMC) and continued for ten days. Another wave of military
exercises reached Taiwan right before the Presidential elections, on 8 March, 1996. Military tests took for eight days. Japan was, also, heavily shocked by China's actions, and, therefore, played a significant role convincing the US to dispatch two aircraft carriers to the Taiwan Strait during the crisis. Japanese Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto sent a special envoy to Washington to press President Bill Clinton “to act quickly and to dispatch troops to the region to contain the situation and protect Taiwan from a possible Chinese assault”36.

Consequently, ignoring American warnings that intimidating Taiwan China possesses threat to American interests, PRC tested M-9 missiles on 7 March, 1996. Then, US announced, that in order to observe Chinese behavior, deployed two aircraft carrier battle groups, “the Independence battle group from Okinawa to the waters east of Taiwan and the Nimitz carries group from the Persian Gulf to the Philippine Sea”37. On March 12 and 13, China launched second set of military exercises. Then, on March 15, it announced “that from March 18 to March 25 the PLA would implement joint air, ground, and naval exercises near Pingtan island, with ten nautical miles from Taiwan-controlled islands”38. By pursuing military tests, PRC wanted to improve PLA`s capabilities, and, also, to show that China is capable to contain Taiwan.

On May 20, 1996, President Lee was inaugurated as the first president in Chinese history elected in popular elections. In his inaugural speech “he praised Taiwan's democracy and its people and emphasized that the country was entering a new era and therefore must deepen democracy. … [He, also,] scolded Beijing's leaders for conducting war games, but promised the dialogue with them and rejected the course of Taiwan independence”39. President Lee alerted Taiwan to prepare for possible invasion from Mainland, and “gave a series of extremely persuasive and galvanizing speeches that generated solidarity”40 in facing China's treats. Furthermore, in August, 1996, Lee introduced his new approach towards China – “no haste, be patient (jieji yongren)”41. Thus, he sought to prevent big capital outflows from Taiwan into Mainland42.

On the Chinese side, Beijing was relatively satisfied with the result of its actions. China learned that it is capable to paralyze Taiwan's military capabilities in short term, “while the US force may be left with no
sufficient time to intervene”\textsuperscript{43}. And similarly, Taiwan’s economy and society would suffer less damage by this kind of military actions. Jiang Zemin was similarly successful with the US reaction. In October, 1997, during his first state visit to the US, he personally “pressured Clinton to take an unambiguous stand on the issue of Taiwan’s international status”\textsuperscript{44}. The administration of Bill Clinton pledged to “three no’s’ – no support of Taiwan independence, no support for two Chinas (or “one China, one Taiwan”), and no support for Taiwan’s membership in international organizations that require statehood”\textsuperscript{45}. Jiang Zemin himself consolidated power and strengthened the position over his main competitor Qiao Shi, and ousted him “from the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau at the CCP’s Fifteenth Party Congress in September 1997”\textsuperscript{46}.

Nonetheless all the “misunderstandings” regarding unification and Taiwan’s independence and democratization, PRC “continued to call on the ROC to resume negotiations based on the one-China principle, but the ROC insisted on discussing only “functional” issues.”\textsuperscript{47} In 1998, ARATS chairman Wang Daohan informed Taiwanese that China is ready to resume talks on unification issue under the principle of one China. The chairmen of SEF and ARATS met in Shanghai. Koo Chen-fu and Wang Daohan agreed to meet in Taiwan the next year and continue to negotiate “despite of high levels of distrust”\textsuperscript{48}.

The short-lived détente was suspended by Lee Teng-hui’s “state-to-state” or “liangguo lun” concept. In July, 1999, President Lee “declared that cross-Strait relations were “special state-to-state” relations.”\textsuperscript{49} On July 9, Lee was interviewed by Deutsche Welle Radio of Germany and told that future China-Taiwan relations would be conducted on special state-to-state basis\textsuperscript{50}. After that, China postponed Wang Daohan’s visit to Taiwan and the US was surprised by such an unexpected twist of events. Later Lee told to the American political scientist J. T. Dryer, that “he made such a demand to forestall Wang Daohan’s trip, where Wang, he had declared, was going to proclaim that Taiwan accepted PRC’s One-China principle.”\textsuperscript{51} Overall, as the aftermath of strait crisis, the political relations between Taiwan and China cooled down after the active attempts to reunify both sides in the post-Cold war era.

Even though Beijing claims, that any elections in Taiwan are only of local importance, the mainland, actually, is very interested in those who will rule the island and, also, has favorite candidates during the election campaign since 1996. After Lee’s slap in the face with his “two states’ theory” in 1999, Beijing wanted to cover itself from further Taiwanese actions of such kind, and issued the White Paper named *The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue* in February, 2000. The PRC reiterated that “One-China Principle is the foundation stone for the Chinese government’s policy on Taiwan” and “Only by adhering to the One-China Principle can peaceful reunification be achieved.” Thus, China did not show any signs of flexibility regarding “One-China Principle” and is not willing to make concessions regarding the unification issue in the future.

The PRC hoped for the Guomindag candidates to win and the victory of a “blue” candidate would be an easement to carry unification process on, and it seemed that Chen Shui-bian was not in China’s taste. Before the elections, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji “made tough remarks …, and warned the citizens of Taiwan not to choose Chen.” Chinese premier, also, was very direct at that time noticing “that “we cannot accept Taiwan independence, that’s our bottom line, and it’s the heartfelt demand of China’s 1.2 billion people.” China once again demonstrated that Taiwan is a vital remaining peace in a geopolitical and security puzzle and it is not apt to surrender to Taiwanese “separatists”. Important to notice, that despite of verbal intimidation of Zhu Rongji, China did not pursue military actions demonstrating that it does not want at the moment to unbalance the economic development by wasting too much energy on military maneuvers. China merely wanted “to avoid risk and cost of any military option of re-unifying Taiwan unless otherwise needed.” Consequently, on 18 March, 2000, Chen Shui-bian, “representing the opposition Democratic Progressive Party, was elected president, ending the Nationalist Party’s more than fifty-year governance of Taiwan.” The other day, China’s Politburo meeting was held, and
Jiang Zemin announced a “sixteen-character policy” towards Taiwan – *renzhen guancha* (observe closely), *naixin dengdai* (wait with patience), *buji buzao* (guard against impetuously) and *baochi gaoya* (maintain high pressure)\(^{58}\). Later on, in March, he developed “thirty-two character policy” – “*tongyi sixiang* [unify thinking], *jianchi yuanze* [uphold principle], *lengjing guancha* [observe calmly], *fandu cutong* [oppose independence and promote reunification], *yizhan cuhe* [adopt force to promote peace], *buji buzao* [guard against impetuously], *baochi yali* [maintain pressure], and *liangbian tanpan* [bilateral talks]”\(^{59}\).

Inasmuch, China’s position on reunification was stable and rock-like, Chen Shui-bian could experiment on “Taiwan independence” issue not risking too much to be entangled into war with the mainland. First of all, he was, also, not wishful to accept “One-China Principle”, he thought that “to accept the One China Principle as Beijing understood it would be to concede that his government did not possess sovereignty”\(^{60}\).

**FIRST STEPS OF CHEN SHUI-BIAN AND THE ISSUE OF UNIFICATION**

President Chen was unknown to Chinese politicians; therefore, they used “wait-and-see” tactics towards him, what meant to observe his first steps and further actions and then decide how to react to his policies. Also, the Central Committee of CCP at Beidaihe meetings in July and August reached the consensus, that “as long as Chen did not declare independence, and it was unlikely in the near future, there would be no need to take military action”\(^{61}\). China believes that time is for its favour now and prefers *status quo* situation. However, *status quo* is also developing notion and is not static. For Taiwan *status quo* means, that the island “is an independent society that has its own armed forces, its own currency and own political system, but lacks the *de jure* independence of a sovereign nation”\(^{62}\). In the PRC’s perception *status quo* refers to the long term unification goal and “can be tolerated as long as Taiwan does not make any move toward formal independence and other nations do not indicate a willingness to acknowledge Taiwan’s independence”\(^{63}\).

Furthermore, the most important issues creating tensions in cross-
strait were Chen’s policies regarding his concept of “one country on each side”, also, his intentions to amend island’s Constitution, to initiate referendums on sensitive political issues, trial to abolish National Unification Guidelines. In addition, important to notice, that at that time, China was trying very hard to isolate Taiwan internationally, thus, triggering Taiwan’s security.

Chen starting his presidential term pledged to develop peace and prosperity in the region. He announced “5 No’s” policy referring to “not declaring Taiwan’s independence, not changing the national title, not pushing for the inclusion of “state-to-state” in the Constitution, not promoting a referendum to change the status quo on independence or unification, and not abolishing the National Unification Council or the National Unification Guidelines”64. Chen, also, was willing to continue negotiations and cooperation with China; therefore, he put forth three conditions to start cross-Strait dialogue. First condition was “to negotiate on the basis of equality between Beijing and Taipei”, secondly, “to resolve disputes by peaceful means”, and “to establish no preset conditions on the future of cross-Strait relations”65. Hearing Chen’s public statements Beijing as well as Washington could not stay calm, because even though Chen looked conciliatory, it was still not clear, what are his real intentions. The same inaugural address of May, 2000, illustrates, that President Chen was not willing to accept the 1992 consensus and “One-China” Principle. Moreover, he “failed to accede to the Chinese request to state that he is Chinese [zhongguo ren]. He used the word huaren instead”66. The word “huaren – 華人” means “ethnic Chinese”67, and not necessarily living in Mainland China.

In 2002, China and Taiwan were still sharing attempts to improve cross-strait relations by fostering economic and cultural integration. China softened its position towards one-China Principle saying that “Taiwan and China are both a part of China,” rather than declaring what is had always claimed up until that point, that Taiwan is a part of China”68. Moreover, in the same year, “the PRC formally invited members of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), Taiwan’s pro-independence party, to the Mainland as long as the members were not pro-independence advocates”69. However, Chen’s words “more

economics, less politics70, demonstrated his understanding that economic ties with the PRC is of first importance for Taiwan.

However, China’s efforts to isolate Taiwan internationally triggered off Chen`s anger. When in July, 2002, the state of Nauru switched diplomatic relations from Taiwan to China, Chen proclaimed, that Taiwan will “go its own way”71. Thus, in August, 2002, saying that Taiwan has always been a sovereign country and that “Each side is a country [yibian yiguo] called for the legislation for the referendum on Taiwan’s Independence”72. Continuously, in 2003, Taiwan lost one more ally – Liberia. It was obvious, that China is not willing to lose Taiwan at any cost.

China was carefully watching Chen`s steps and was convinced that his actions do not coincide with his words, therefore, “Chinese leaders quickly adopted a policy of shunning Chen [and] invited Chen`s opponents to visit China”73. Also, China installed more missiles targeting Taiwan to intimidate Taiwan’s citizens. In addition, China’s new leader Hu Jintao understood that Taiwan is “one of the most burdensome issues facing him.”74 It was obvious, that Taiwan will not accept one-China Principle as it is defined by the PRC, and it will be a long term security issue not only in the region, but also in international level, therefore, Beijing adopted “a strategy of reinforcing both hands, i.e., a hard hand will become harder and a soft hand will become softer”75. As a sign of “softer hand” one can see China’s decision of 2003 to accept that “one-China principle is no longer required for Taiwan to establish trade, shipping and postal links”76.

The last important issue in Chen`s first term was the referendum issue. In January 2004, President proposed the questions for the referendum to be voted with presidential election in March, 2004. He proposed to vote whether “Should Taiwan strengthen its missile defense system if China refuses to withdraw its missiles targeted on Taiwan? Should Taiwan set up a “peace interactive network” to build consensus between people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait?”77 Seeing Chen`s actions and approaching elections in Taiwan China was rather calm. Beijing only opposed referendum. According to Zhang Mingqing, spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, “the mainland respects the aspiration of the compatriots in Taiwan to be masters of their own
community, but Taiwan authorities are deliberately using the “referendum” as a cover-up to challenge the one-China principle in a bid to split the motherland”78. Important to notice that “neither referendum proposal was passed, as voter turnout did not reach the required threshold”79. Thus, one can find that China learned the lesson not to intimidate Taiwan by military means. It has found the other ways to contain Taiwanese “disobedience”, which will be mentioned in further analysis.

Unexpectedly to many, President Chen managed to remain in presidential office for the second term. There was a scandal leading the elections. Chen and vice-president candidate Annette Lu in a suspicious incident were shot, though, none of them was hurt. Opposition suspected that the “shot” event was stage-managed80. PRC could not influence the choice of the electorate, and as Yasuhiro Matsuda writes, “PRC had become a “paper tiger” by not conducting any military intimidation and virtually allowed Chen Shui-bian to hold the referendum”81. Beside the referendum issue, President Chen was, also, keen to amend the Constitution of the Republic of China and to abolish the National Unification Council and its guidelines.

Regarding the amendment of ROC Constitution, Chen promised that “This new Constitution will not touch on national sovereignty or territory, nor on issues of unification or independence, but will take as its base the realization of good governance and reform of the government system”82. In the interview for BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) Chen confirmed, that “This new constitution will have no bearing on the issue of unification or independence nor will it change the status quo”83. Local leaders in Taiwan did not have a common opinion about Chen’s “constitutional” venture. For instance, the Guomindang leader of that time Ma Ying-jeou “urged the head of the state to “wake up” from daydreaming to try to tackle economic problems facing Taiwan instead”84. On the contrary, former President Lee Teng-hui supported the idea, “that Taiwan has to have a new Constitution”85. The PRC, also, warned that any amendments “will result in tensions and danger in the Taiwan Straits”86.

Chinese concern was not without reason, because referendums and constitutional issues could possibly drive Taiwan towards
independence. In order to preempt Taiwanese “independence”, in 14 March 2005, at the Third Session of the Tenth National People’s Congress, the *Anti-Secession Law* was adopted. Beijing once more stressed that if Taiwan declares independence, “the state [PRC] shall employ non-peaceful means and other necessary measures to protect China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity”\(^87\). The law prompted thousands of Taiwanese to attend the rally against China. Taiwanese officials also made clear, that they are not intimidated by the law\(^88\).

Beijing was becoming more prick on Taiwan issue and further isolated Chen. After *Anti-Secession Law* was passed, in April 2005, the PRC “invited KMT [Kuomintang or Guomindang] opposition leaders James Soong and Lien Chan to the Mainland in an attempt to court President Chen’s adversaries”\(^89\). In the international level, Beijing continuously wooed the countries recognizing Taiwan’s sovereignty to its side in order to limit Taiwan’s international space and the space of actions regarding its independence. For example, in 2003, Liberia switched diplomatic relations to Beijing, Senegal in 2005, Chad in 2006, Costa Rica in 2007, and Malawi in 2008. As Chao Chien-min expressed, it “has added fuel to the alienation that Taiwan has felt towards China”\(^90\).

Furthermore, at the beginning of 2006, President Chen roiled the waters by “publically announcing his intention to abolish the National Unification Guidelines and National Unification Council”\(^91\), which was an advisory body for the unification of China and Taiwan. This was worrisome even to the US, and the White House sent its envoy Dennis Wilder to Taipei to dissuade Chen to renounce his decision\(^92\). However, Chen did not change the decision and, thus, became isolated not only by Chinese, but also by Americans.

**CONCLUSIONS**

In the short term, it is a significant task to follow the maneuvers of Taiwanese and Chinese political elite and their decisions in domestic level, because their policies will create new political conditions for unification policy.

In the long term, there are several proposals from academic
perspective how Taiwan and China could approach each other. First of all, both sides should stabilize cross-strait relations as first priority through systematic establishment leaving all controversial issues aside. Secondly, Taiwan should strengthen overall competitiveness in external activities rather than lock itself in internal political discord, reshape its image and engage in regional economic integration. It needs to reengage the region with cooperative and responsive manner.

The current Taiwanese president Ma Ying-jeou thinks, that closer cross-strait relations are better for both sides and, also, for East Asian region in general. However, he did not express that in order to achieve the peace and good relations between China and Taiwan they have to unite and become one state. First of all, they have to strengthen their economic relations.

Finally, both sides should strengthen responsibility for regional security. As for Taiwan, its national security should not be limited to traditional warfare against possible invasion of China, but rather should be broadened and redefined vis-à-vis China’s military buildup and the US-Japan security cooperation. Overall, both China and Taiwan should be patient and willing to follow the peaceful way of unification and try not to challenge the regional stability and security.

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SANTRAUKA

SUSIVENIJIMO KLAUSIMAS KINIJOS IR TAIVANO SANTYKIUOSE 1995–2008 METAIS

Raktiniai žodžiai: Kinijos ir Taivano santykiai, susivienijimas, krizė, karinis įbauginimas.